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Managed by NASA's Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, a pilot probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) of 
the NASA Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) was performed in early 2006. The PRA methods used 
follow the general guidance provided in the NASA PRA Procedures Guide for NASA Managers and 
Practitioners'. Phased-mission based event trees and fault trees are used to model a lunar sortie mission 
of the CEV - involving the following phases: launch of a cargo vessel and a crew vessel; rendezvous of 
these two vessels in low Earth orbit; transit to th$: moon; lunar surface activities; ascension &om the lunar 
surface; and return to Earth. The analysis is based upon assumptions, preliminary system diagrams, and 
failure data that may involve large uncertainties or may lack f o m l  validation. Furthermore, some of the 
data used were based upon expert judgment or extrapolated from similar components~systems. This paper 
includes a discussion of the system-level models and provides an overview of the analysis results used to 
identify insights into CEV risk drivers, and trade and sensitivity studies. Lastly, the PRA model was used 
to determine changes in risk as the system configurations or key parameters are modified. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The pilot CEV probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) was conducted for the Constellation Program and in 
particular, to gain safety and performance insights involving into the design and operatzon of a Crew 
Exploration Vehicle (CEV) for a Lunar Soriie Mission2. The assessment was initiated to gain an increased 
undemanding of possible design trades associated with systems and operations for this mission Tbis 
effort was coordinated with other analyses to assess the feasibility of establishing safety and reliability 
requiremenQ associated with the probability of loss-of-mission (LOM) and the probability of loss-of-crew 
(LOC)~. The study team worked to address overall analysis scope and methods, mission event tree 
structure, system dependencies, success criteria, and basic event and component failure data. 
The initial objectives of this sady were to help optimize the CEV design by conducting integrated 
assessments and trade studies among the systcms and across the entire mission profile. The scope of this 
assessment is the CEV consisting of the Crew Module (CM), Service Module (SM) and Launch Abort 
System (LAS). This assessnlent does not include models for other mission vehicles or operations [Cargo 
Launch Vehicle (CaLV), Earth D e p d e  Stage (EDS) and Lunar Surface Access Module (LSAM)]. For 
these vehicles and operations, data were derived from the ESAS~ Study. 
The objectives of this study w m  to: 
Provide insight into desigos options needed to meet mission reliability requiremw.~. 
Provide a hmework to evaluate proposed CEV designs. 
Provide a basis for the development of a complete detailed phased mission integrated PRA of 
proposed vehicles included in associated missions. 
Provide a quantitative model that can be used to suppmt trade studies, operational decisions, and 
upgrade improvements throughout the program life-cycle. 
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2. METHODOLOGY AXD MODJUh'G 
The pilot CEV PRA utilizes a "phased" approach to decompose portions of the mission. As shown in 
Figure 1, the mission is covered by eight phases from launch to earth return. The mission phases are: 
- Phase I - Two launches to Low Earth Orbit (LEO). The first launch is the Caqo Launch Vehicle 
(CaLV) consisting of a Lunar Surface Access Module (LSAM) and an Earth Demure Stage (EDS). 
The second launch is the Crew Lam& Vehicle (CLV) which contains the CEV, consisting of a Crew 
ModuIe (CM), a Service Module (SM), and a Launch Abort System (LAS). 
- Phase 2 -Rendezvous of the CaLVand the CEK The EDS is used (via Trans-Lunar Injection VLI 
b u d ,  then expended, lmving the CEV and LSAM. 
- Phase 3 - Lunar-Orbit Insertion (LOO. The LSAM performs the LO1 for both the CEV and LSAM. 
All members of the CEV crew transfer to the LSAM and it undocks from the CEV for descent to the 
lunar surface. 
- Phase 4 - CEV in lunar orbit. The upnamed CEV remains in a lunar orbit, but will descend to a 
parking orbit during the seven-day 1- mission 
- Phase 5 -Lunar mission. The LSAM is used to descend to and ascend from the lunar surface. A 
typical lunar mission will last up to seven days. 
- Phase 6 - Re-crew CEY. Following the LSAM ascent (the dertcent stage is IeE on the lunar surface), 
the crew docks with and transfer back to the CEV. The LSAM (ascent stage) is expended hack to the 
lunar surface. 
- Phase 7 - Return to Earth. The CEV retums to earth, where the SM is expended when no long- 
needed 
- Phase 8 -Earth landing. The CEV lands on the Earth with a direct entry and parachuteassisted land 
touchdown. 
Figure 1. Mission phases for the lunar sortie crew with cargo. 
The mission phases are modeled using the two eveat trees, shown in Figure 2, to identify scenarios. Fault 
trees were used to model system falures within a specific phase. The undesirable outcomes addressed in 
this PRA are based upon two figures of merit (or end states) for the CEV, namely; M M  and LOC: 
* LOG provides safety insight for conducting this mission and returning the crew safely to earth. 
U I M  provides insight on mission performance for a 1- sortie. 
These above two figures of merit are not muhdly exclusive. A LOM end state d t s  in an attempted 
~tmn40-Ehtl~ If the abort or retum-to-Ea!th and landing fail, the LOM leads to an LOC. 
Figure 2. Phased Mission Event Trees 
The system models in this PRA (fault W) are Mnsistenk with the pmposed design architecture associated with 
the initial design r e f i  mission. The M t  trees capture the wnceptuat train design and the intmnnected 
nature of the various systems and subsystems both within a mission phase and across the mission proftle. An 
inter-system dependency mahix was used to identify the operattng c d t i o n  and dependencies among the 
system during each part~cular mission phase modeled in the event trees. The opemting condition for each 
systun along with the definitions of LOC and LOM led to the development of success criteria: 
Afta the lunar missionhas been completed successfidly @base 5), the mission is assumed to be complete 
and LOM is no longer considered; only UX: is considered. This assumption implies that the "mission" part of 
the lunar mission is wmpleted during Phase 5. 
Catastrophic M m  pmvide no chance for crew survival leading ditecirly to LOC. Success of system 
needed for an abort and landing rsult in LOM but not LOC. Failure of system needed for a successil abort or 
landing during a retum-to-Ea!th scenario result in LOC. 
Genemlly for the systans modeled; for a the  strity: system, UIM is as& to occur when two of three 
&rings fail and only one string is lei? functional (i.e., 2-out-of-3 strings Eziled). For a two string system, LOM is 
assumed to occur when one of the strings fail and only one is left functional (i.e., i-out-of-:! strings 
failed). LOC occurs upon loss of all strings in a single systaa 
Common-cause Elilurea are modeled for a l l  redundant systans. 
The PRA model wntains seven primary systems that perform the major functions for thc mission to the 
lunar surface and return to earth: 
Propulsion including the main engine (ME), reaction control system (RCS), mechanical equipment 
(pumps, valves and controllers), and the propellantr%elium tanks. 
Avionics system that receives inputs from the crew, sensors and external communications; perform 
navigation, guidance, and intemal state calculations; and provides control and actuation signals. 
Electric Power System (EPS) including batteries, solar arrays and electrical distribution and control 
subsystems. 
Active Thermal Control System (ATCS) including heaters, coolers, condensate controller and 
mechanical equipment. 
bv-konmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS). 
Launch Abort System @,AS). 
Pyrotechnic (PYRO) devices that affects component separation 
Each system is modeled for each phase in the mission. The overall PRA contains: 2 event trees with 2 end 
states (LOG and LOM), 155 fault trees (973 gates) and 874 bas~c events. This PKA was developed by the 
OSMA team over the course of approximately 90 days using the SAP HIRE^ PRA software. The basic 
event data were derived from the Space Shuttle PRA, the International Space Station (PRA), the ESAS 
Study and mlari ty  to heritage systemsicomponents. 
3. RESULTS 
The overall results of the PRA indicate that the mean probability of LOC is 0.017 with 5% and 95% 
uncertainties of 4.6E-05 and 0.071, respectively. The mean probability of LOM is 0.12 with 5% and 95% 
uncertainties of 3.7E-04 and 0.48, respectively. The overall mission probability and uncertainty for LOC 
and LOM are shown in Figure 2. The cumulative mean probability of LOC is given in Figure 4. 
The dominant contributors to LOC for the overall mission account for about 66% of the overall mean 
probability of LOC: 
During Phase 4 (CEV in lunar orbit) the CEV fails to stay in Lunar orbit and the crew fails to recover 
the CEV upon retum from the Lunar surface p5.OE-03). 
* During Phase 8 (Earth Landing) failure to recover the crew (search and rescue) after landmg (P=2.6E- 
03). 
&ring Phase 8 (Eaxth Landing) common cause failure of 2 parachutes (out of 3) during deployment 
(P=9.8E-04). 
Lhbg  Phase 8 (Earth Landing) the CM RCS fails to provide correct attitude (P=9.OE-04). 
The dominant contributors to LOM for the overall mission account for approximately 63% of the overall 
mean probability of LOW 
- During Phase 5 (Lunar Mission) unspecified failures occu and the crew fails to recover from those 
failures (P3.5E-02). 
During Phase 1 (Two launches to Low Earth Orbit LEO]) EDS fails to loiter in LEO pl.OE-02). 
During Phase 1 (Two launches to Low Earth Orbit LEO]) LSAM fails to loiter in LEO (P=l.OE-02). 
During Phase 2 (Rendezvous of the CaLV and CEV) thrt EDS, LSAM, and CEV TLI burn fails 
(?=l .OE-02). 
During Phase 2 (Rendezvous of the CaLV and CEV) the EUS, LSAM, and CEV TLI mid-course 
correction bum fails (P-1.0E-02). 
Figure 3. Overall Mission Probabiii and Uncertainty for LOC and LOM 
I LOC LOM 
Figure 4. Cumulative Mean Probability of LOC 
The mission phases with the largest contribution to mission LOC mean failure probability are: 
Phase 4, CEVin Lunar Orbit: 5E-03 (30%) 
Phase 8, Earth Landing: 5E-03 (30%) 
Phase 5 ,  Lunar Mission: 5E-03 (30%) 
The mission phases with the largest contribution to mission LOM mean failure probability are: 
Phase 5, Lunar Mission: 4E-02 (35%) 
Phase 1, Tho Launches to Low Earth Odi t  (LEO): 4E-02 (34%) 
Phase 2, Rendezvous of the CaLVand CEV: 3E-02 (21%) 
The relative contribution to of LC€ and LOM from each phase is shown in Figure 5 
Figure 5. Relative Contribution to the Mean Probability of LOM and LOC from each Phase 
Inspection of Figure 4 provides insight into which mission phase wntributes most to the risk of both LOC 
and LOM. Comparing the two pie charts indicates that there are two mission phases that contribute most 
to both I>OC and LOM. Fmm these results, Further consideration with respect to the design and 
operations involved in Mission Phase 5; descend to, lunar surface activities and ascend From the lunar 
surface, will have the most impact on reducing risk for both safety and performance. In the same way but 
to a lesser degree, more attention to Mission Phase 2; low earib orbit rendezvous of the CaLV and the 
CEV and transit to moon, will have similar affects. 
These results identify potential significant risk drivers that require further study to eompletely understand 
their failure contribution and to identify design and operational measures and controls that will prevent 
(reduce the likelihood of) andlor mitigate (reduce the consequences associated with) the risk of LOC and 
LOM. The list of dominant risk contributors indicates what types of failures during which mission phases 
may require attention to manage mission risk. This contributor information is often referred to as risk 
insights, because it provides both quaiitative information (e.g., a description of combinations of mission 
failure events) as well as quantitative risk results. This type of information may suggest alternative 
system designs, operating modes, backups, &or diverse methods to accomplish mission functions. 
4. TRADE AND SENSITIVITY STXIDIES 
Numerous trade and sensitivity studies were conducted with this PRA model of the CEV Lunar Mission. 
The raults of selected studies are presented below. 
4.1 Removal of One Active Thennal Control System (ATCS) String 
The nominal ATCS is modeled with two redundant strings. Removing one ATCS string From the model 
simulates a CEV design with a single ATCS string. The evaluation of the mission with a single string 
ATCS shows a small effect on LOC (-5% increase) indicating that the single string ATCS is robust with 
respect to other contributors to overall missio11 LOC. With a one string ATCS, the dominant contributor 
to the mean probability of LOC are: CEV fails to stay in lunar orbit; failure to recover the crew after 
landing; and failure of the Service Module bum for return to Earth. 
Under the model assumptions, LOM is not applicable. When LOC occurs &om failure of the single ATCS 
string, a LOM also occurs. This result occurs because the model assumes that LOM results if one ATCS 
string (out of 2) fails 
4.2 Removal of Launch Abort System (LAS) 
This trade study was performed to evaluate the @fiance of the LAS. This study is only pertinent to 
Phase 1, since the LAS is jettisoned prior to CEV injection into LEO. Removal of the LAS increases the 
overall mission mean probability of LOC by a factor of about 2 (100%). This is a significant result. With 
the LAS, failures during Phase 1 leading to LOC contributes only about 0.6% to overall mission mean 
probability of LOC. R m v a i  of the LAS results in increasing the mean probability of LOC for Phase 1 
by a factor of about 170 and makes Phase 1 the dominant contributor to the overall mission probability of 
LOC. 
4.3 Failure of One Avionics String 
This sensitivity study was conducted to evaluate failure of Avionics string during the three sequential 
phases: Pbase 1, Launch to Low Earth Orbit; Phase 4, CEV in Lunar Orbit; and Phase 8, Earth Landing. 
Since this system has three redundant strings, this sensitivity study provides insight concerning the 
importanw to the overall mission probabiiity of LOC and LOM of the two failure tolerance requirement. 
A comparison of the change in the probability of LOC from the failure of one Avionic string for the three 
phases is shown in Figure 6. If one Avionic string fails during Phase 1, there is a 6% increase in the 
probability of LOC (a factor of about 1.06) and a negligible increase in the probability of LOM. 
Following the failure of one Avionics string for Phase 4, the probability of LOC increases by a factor of 
about 2.5 (150% increase), and for Phase 8, by a factor of about 4 (290% increase). 
Failure of one Avionics string during Phase 1 has a negligible effect on the probability of LOM (4%). 
For Phase 4, failure of one Avionics string leads to an increase in the probability of LOM by a factor of 
about 2 (128%). For failure during Phase 8, there is no effect on LOM since the mission is assumed to be 
complete and LOM is not considered. 
These results show the dependence of these phases on the Avionics and the sensitivity of the analysis on 
the wmmon cause failures of this three string systera The Avionics system is relatively robust and a two 
string Avionics system only reduces the overall probability of LOC and LOM by about 1%. However, 
because of the potential for wmmon cause failures, the failure of one string during Phase 1 increases the 
probability of LOC and LOM by about 6%. As the mission progresses, the safety and perto-ce of the 
CEV become more dependent on the Avionics system. 
Figure 6. Comparison of the Failure of One Avionics on the Probability of LOC for Selected 
Mission Phases 
5. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The information generated by a PRA includes qualitative and quantitative results that support risk 
informed decisions to w a g e  mission risk by providing a perspective on risk contributors. The PRA for 
this study produced design level (formulation phase) risk related information concerning a Lunar Sortie 
Mission for the Constellation Program. As more design details become available, more complex risk 
assessment and management issues can be addressed by the PRA. Among these perspectives, 
assessments, and issues are: 
Assessment of compliance to mission reliability requirements 
Identification of significant mission risk contributors 
Determination of the importance of events, systems, mission phases, etc to mission risk 
Continued support of trade studies 
Support mission planning and development 
Assessment of the impact of external events 
Assessment of alternative or supplemental operating modes 
Assessment of alternative mission profiles 
Support for operational risk management 
Assessment of important precursors 
Acronyms 
ATCS - 
CaLV - 
CEV - 
CLV - 
CM - 
ECLSS - 
EDS - 
EPS - 
ESAS - 
ISS - 
Active T h d  Control System 
Cargo Launch Vehicle 
Crew Exploration Vehicle 
Crew Launch Vehicle 
Crew Module 
Environmental Control and L~fe  
Support System 
Earth D e p m e  Stage 
Electric Power System 
Exploration System Architecture 
Study 
International Space Station 
LAS - 
LEO - 
LOC - 
LO1 - 
LOM - 
LSAM - 
PYRO - 
RCS - 
SM - 
TLI - 
Launch Abort System 
Cow Earth Orbit 
Loss of Crew 
Lunar Orbit Injection 
Loss of Mission 
Lunar Surface Access Module 
Pyrotechnic Device 
Reaction Control System 
Service Module 
Trans-Lunar Injection 
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